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Dark clouds over the Ukrainian gas market reform
Wojciech Konończuk, Sławomir Matuszak
In September, three out of five members of the supervisory board of Naftogaz, Ukraine’s largest 
gas company, announced their resignation and accused the government of stepping up political 
interference in the company’s activity and blocking measures aimed at reforming the company. 
This represents yet another instance of the fight for control over Naftogaz and its profit-making 
subsidiaries, Ukrgazvydobuvannya (which extracts over 70% of Ukraine’s gas) and Ukrtransgaz 
(the transit pipeline and gas storage facilities operator), which has been gaining momentum in 
recent months. On one side of the dispute lies what is broadly understood as the ruling camp 
(the surrounding of the president and the prime minister), while the other side is the pro-reform 
management of Naftogaz, headed by Andriy Kobolev and backed by Western institutions.
It seems that the government’s goal is to regain control over Naftogaz, including over finan-
cial flows between its subsidiaries. The mounting conflict has resulted in a cessation of the 
gas sector reform, which has been ongoing for over a year. Reforming the gas market had 
hitherto been viewed as one of the biggest successes of the state modernisation programme 
that was launched after the Maidan Revolution. Moreover, this halting of the reform process 
poses the risk that it may subsequently be abandoned entirely. 
The status of the gas sector reform
The gas sector reform process, which is part of 
the key reforms undertaken by Ukrainian state, 
was started in April 2015, when the Ukrainian 
parliament passed a law on the gas sector . The 
law provides, among other things, for unbun-
dling the state-controlled company Naftogaz 
into companies dealing with gas extraction, 
transport, distribution and storage. This is to be 
accompanied by the creation of a competitive 
gas market in line with the rules of the EU’s so-
called Third Energy Package. Gas reform is of 
key importance for Ukraine due to Naftogaz’s 
significance for the condition of public financ-
es (in 2014, the company recorded a deficit 
of 106.6 billion hryvnias, which accounted for 
6.7% of Ukraine’s GDP) and the fact that since 
the 1990s the trade in gas has been a major 
source of ‘corruption income’ for Ukrainian rul-
ing elites. At the same time, this also makes the 
reform exceedingly difficult to carry out1.
Under the reform implementation, a process 
was launched to marketise the (formerly subsi-
dised) prices of gas paid by individual custom-
ers, resulting in several subsequent price hikes. 
This considerably improved Naftogaz’s financial 
standing – in 2016, for the first time in histo-
ry, the company recorded a profit (of around 
US$ 1 billion). In May 2016, a new company 
supervisory board was appointed; it included 
three foreign members (citizens of the United 
Kingdom). This was intended to guarantee 
1 For more see W. Konończuk, Reform #1. Why Ukraine has 
to reform its gas sector, OSW Commentary, 2 September 
2015, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2015-09-02/reform-1-why-ukraine-has-to-re-
form-its-gas-sector
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the board’s independence (the remaining two 
board members were appointed by the Ukrain-
ian government). In July 2016, the government 
approved a plan to restructure Naftogaz, which 
provided for the removal from its structure of 
transit gas pipelines and gas storage facilities, 
and for transforming them into two independ-
ent companies: Main Gas Pipelines of Ukraine 
(MGU) and Underground Gas Storage Facili-
ties of Ukraine. The unbundling will happen no 
sooner than 30 days after the Arbitration Court 
in Stockholm has passed a binding verdict in 
a dispute between Naftogaz and Gazprom. 
This is expected to happen within a couple of 
months. In September 2016, the Ukrainian par-
liament, for its part, passed a law on establish-
ing a new energy market regulator, which was 
an important move for continuing the reform 
(the regulator is expected to achieve full in-
dependence no sooner than in early 2019)2. It 
should be emphasised that these actions were 
carried out to meet the conditions set in the 
cooperation programme between Ukraine and 
the IMF and to enable Ukraine to receive subse-
quent instalments of financial aid.
In subsequent months, the government carried 
out activities which were de facto intended to 
limit the freedom of action by Naftogaz’s exec-
utives – promoters of the reform, who enjoyed 
support from EU institutions. In September 
2016, the Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade decided to deprive Naftogaz of con-
trol over Ukrtransgaz and place the latter under 
2 T. Iwański, Ukraine: new regulator of the energy sec-
tor, OSW Analyses, 28 September 2016, https://www.
osw.waw.pl /en /publikacje /analyses /2016-09-28/
ukraine-new-regulator-energy-sector
direct supervision by the ministry. Officially, this 
happened on the basis of a request submitted 
by the then head of Ukrtransgaz, Ihor Prokopiv. 
Following criticism from the EU, the IMF and 
the Energy Community, all of whom viewed this 
move as standing in contrast to Ukraine’s com-
mitments regarding the implementation of the 
Third Energy Package, Ukraine’s government 
withdrew from its decision. In March 2017, the 
Ukrainian government decided to expand Naf-
togaz’s supervisory board from five to seven 
members. The aim of this move was to deprive 
the three independent board members of their 
dominant position in the board – they typical-
ly supported the company’s management. Due 
to the composition of the committee tasked 
with selecting two new members, the selec-
tion of pro-government individuals was mere-
ly a matter of time. This, in turn, would result 
in the government gaining effective control of 
the supervisory board, and thereby of Nafto-
gaz’s management. The government’s decision 
triggered protest on the part of independent 
board members, who then threatened to sub-
mit their resignation for the first time. At the 
same time, the forming of the new composition 
of the energy regulator has already been de-
layed by several months, which undermines the 
energy market reform as a whole.
Over recent months, international institutions 
(including the EBRD3 in April and the IMF4 in 
September) have repeatedly criticised Kyiv for 
the delay in implementing the gas sector reform 
measures and emphasised the risk of regression 
in the implementation process. In particular, 
they pointed to the attempt by the government 
to retain full control over companies in the gas 
sector, which involves limiting the process of 
3 P. Polityuk, N. Zinets, EBRD says reform of Ukraine’s 
Naftogaz in danger of unravelling, Reuters, 11  April 
2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-naf-
togaz-ebrd/ebrd-says-reform-of-ukraines-naftogaz-in-
danger-of-unravelling-idUKL8N1HJ27T 
4 S. Musaieva, D. Lipton, IMF: Ukraine risks reversing, 
Ukrayinska Pravda, 15 September 2017, http://www.
pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2017/09/15/7155220/ 
In recent months, the government has 
been limiting the actions by Naftogaz’s 
management – the promoter of the reform 
enjoying support from EU institutions.
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expanding the competences of the companies’ 
executive bodies that is intended to reduce the 
government’s potential for interfering in their 
activities. 
The dispute over Naftogaz’s subsidiary 
companies
Following their resignation, the independent 
members of Naftogaz’s supervisory board ac-
cused the government of interfering in the ac-
tivities of Ukrtransgaz (UTG) and Ukrgazvydobu-
vannya (UGV), the most profitable companies 
in the structure of Naftogaz, and of disrupting 
the preparations for the unbundling process. 
In February 2017, Naftogaz’s supervisory board 
dismissed Prokopiv due to his alleged misappro-
priation of funds worth around US$ 80 million, 
which was reported in the company’s internal 
audit and in an audit carried out by internation-
al audit company, Deloitte. In response to this, 
a few weeks later the government appointed 
Prokopiv deputy minister of energy responsible 
for the gas sector, including responsibility for 
the supervision of Naftogaz. In an open letter, 
the supervisory board members mentioned the 
appointment as deputy minister of an individ-
ual compromised by corruption charges as one 
of the reasons behind their resignation. On 22 
August 2017, Paweł Stańczak (formerly an em-
ployee of PGNiG Technologie S.A.) was appoint-
ed CEO of UTG, but his nomination was blocked 
by the Security Service of Ukraine (controlled by 
the presidential camp) which refused to issue 
a certificate to enable him access to classified 
information. 
Another illustration of the dispute between the 
government and Naftogaz is given by the situ-
ation concerning the transit pipeline network. 
In November 2016, an operator company MGU 
was created. However, so far only its director 
has been appointed (a person associated with 
deputy minister Prokopiv), and the process of 
appointing an independent supervisory board 
is being blocked. Moreover, the government 
is delaying the implementation of the plan to 
separate gas storage business from Naftogaz 
and to transform it into an independent com-
pany. According to Naftogaz’s executives, the 
inclusion of gas storage in the MGU would 
torpedo any chances of attracting a Western 
investor to the company (negotiations are un-
derway with four companies from the EU). In 
September 2017 the government announced 
a plan to add the MGU to the list of state-con-
trolled companies which are exempt from pri-
vatisation, which would rule out this option.
Ukrgazvydobuvannya, for its part, is Ukraine’s 
largest producer of gas, with its output ac-
counting for 73% of the country’s gas extrac-
tion (14.6 billion m3 in 2016), and at the same 
time constituting a major source of ‘corrup-
tion income’ for the Ukrainian leadership5. In 
2015, a new management board was appoint-
ed at UGV, headed by Oleh Prokhorenko, who 
launched internal reforms and announced the 
“20/20” programme intended to increase the 
company’s output to 20 billion m3 by 2020. To 
achieve this, new drilling equipment has been 
purchased, external subcontractors have been 
hired to perform the bores, and the hydraulic 
fracturing technology has begun to be applied 
on a wide scale. These efforts have made it pos-
sible to halt the decline in the output recorded 
5 One example of this can be the actions by Ukrainian 
parliamentary deputy Oleksandr Onishchenko. See 
Після ліквідації схем Онищенка «Укргазвидобування» 
почало приносити прибуток, Укрінформ, 23 No-
vember 2016, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-econ-
omy/2125905-pisla-likvidacii-shem-onisenka-ukr-
gazvidobuvanna-pocalo-prinositi-pributok.html 
The new management board of Ukrgaz-
vydobuvannya has launched internal 
reforms and plans to increase its output 
to 20 billion m3 by 2020.
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hitherto and to increase the output by 3.5% 
between January and August 2017 (in August 
alone an increase of 7% was recorded). Along-
side this, Prokhorenko launched a reform of 
UGV to boost the company’s transparency – for 
example, he terminated all contracts relating to 
joint ventures (under these contracts 210 bores 
were being exploited), which had been used to 
siphon off funds from the company. These ac-
tions quickly resulted in a boost to UGV’s prof-
itability – its net profit increased from just US$ 
6 million in 2015 to almost US$ 500 million in 
2016. Attempts to eliminate corruption mecha-
nisms at the company, in particular in the field 
of public procurement, did not pass unnoticed 
by the government. First, a campaign to dis-
credit Prokhorenko was launched in the media, 
and later, starting from the beginning of 2017, 
the General Prosecutor’s Office and the Securi-
ty Service of Ukraine ordered a series of search-
es to be carried out at UGV’s head office. 
These are not the only actions targeting UGV. 
In late August 2017, the company issued a state-
ment in which it accused the State Geology 
and Natural Resources Service of intentionally 
withholding the decision to prolong UGV’s li-
cence to exploit gas fields. As a consequence, li-
cences relating to 5 gas fields have expired and 
the licence to extract gas from the Shebelinka 
gas field, one of Ukraine’s largest gas fields, 
will expire in October. If this happens, UGV 
estimates that its gas output will decrease by 
3 billion m3 annually6. The requests the compa-
6 Через бездіяльність Державної служби геології та 
надр Україна може втратити 3 млрд куб. м газу 
на рік та більше 28 млрд грн бюджетних коштів, 
Укргазвидобування, 31 August 2017, http://www.
ugv.com.ua/page/cerez-bezdialnist-derzavnoi-sluzbi-
geologii-ta-nadr-ukraina-moze-vtratiti-3-mlrd-kub-m-
gazu-na-rik-ta-bilse-28-mlrd-grn-budzetnih-kostiv
ny had submitted to prolong the licence were 
repeatedly rejected. This should be interpreted 
as actions intended to compromise Prokhoren-
ko and provoke his dismissal. 
The monopoly of the oblgazes is sustained
Another element of the conflict between the 
government and Naftogaz is the price of gas 
paid by households. At present, it is being regu-
lated by a market regulator which is associated 
with the presidential camp (the segment of gas 
supply to industrial recipients was opened to 
free market competition several years ago). In 
2014–2017, as a result of a series of major price 
rises required by the IMF, the price became 
near to the market value. The government, for 
its part, committed itself to reviewing the price 
of gas regularly (twice a year) to avoid exces-
sive discrepancies between the price paid by 
households and the price paid by industrial re-
cipients. According to the adopted formula, in 
October 2017 the price should be increased by 
17%. Naftogaz is not the only actor to request 
this. It is mainly the IMF that quotes this as one 
of the conditions enabling it (if met) to grant 
another loan instalment to Ukraine. However, 
Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman has ruled 
out the price increase scenario and Ihor Nasalyk, 
minister for energy and the coal industry, said it 
is likely that the price would even be reduced.
In the context of gas supply for households, 
regional gas distribution companies (oblgazes 
and miskgazes) represent an additional prob-
lem. Most of them (over 70%) are controlled 
by oligarch Dmytro Firtash. Since 2014, Firtash 
has been under house arrest in Vienna in con-
nection with a motion requesting his extradi-
tion to the United States, where he is to face 
corruption charges. The 2015 gas market law 
introduced the ownership unbundling com-
mitment in relation to companies dealing with 
gas transport and sale. The owners of oblgazes 
have found an easy way to bypass this require- 
The government order solidifies the ac-
tual monopoly of the owners of oblgazes 
over a large portion of the gas market and 
undermines its reform.
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ment – in each oblgaz and miskgaz a separate 
 company was established to perform the sale 
of gas to households; these companies be-
came known as oblgaz-zbuts. In March 2017, 
the government issued an order committing 
Naftogaz to supply gas to 44 oblgaz-zbuts at 
a preferential price set by the government and 
for the amount they would request. This solu-
tion solidifies the actual monopoly the owners 
of oblgazes have over a large portion of the gas 
market and prevents this market from being 
reformed. The government’s decision was crit-
icised by Naftogaz, and in August 2017 the En-
ergy Community (EC) Secretariat and the World 
Bank published an open letter which contained 
a warning that the government order contra-
dicts Ukraine’s commitments towards the EC, 
and initiated proceedings to investigate the 
matter7. The EC drew up proposals of changes to 
foster competition in this market segment and 
forwarded them to the government of Ukraine, 
which has nevertheless failed to respond. 
The end of gas sector reform?
The situation around Naftogaz indicates 
that the dispute between the government of 
Ukraine and the management of Naftogaz is 
of a systemic nature because the goals and vi-
sions of the future adopted by the two sides are 
mutually exclusive. The government’s actions in 
recent months, including the blocking of the 
process of transferring certain responsibilities 
(which at present are vested with the govern-
ment) to gas companies’ executive bodies, de 
facto mean that the reform process at Naftogaz 
has been suspended and that the government 
intends to retain control over the company, 
which is Ukraine’s biggest tax payer. These ac- 
7 Ukraine urged to reform public service obligation 
scheme in the natural gas sector, Energy Community, 
25 August 2017, https://www.energy-community.org/
news/Energy-Community-News/2017/08/25.html 
tions stand in marked contrast to the key as-
sumptions of the gas sector reform.
The resignation of the independent members 
of Naftogaz’s supervisory board ensures the 
board’s paralysis for at least several months or 
until new members are appointed (at present 
the board has only one member – the former 
energy minister supported by the Petro Poro-
shenko Bloc). This will result in the government 
increasing its influence on how the company 
functions. The position of Naftogaz’s manage-
ment has strengthened as a result of the suc-
cessful diversification of the import of gas to 
Ukraine, the victory in the Arbitration Court in 
Stockholm in the first dispute with Gazprom, 
and – most importantly – thanks to the sup-
port it receives from the West. These advantag-
es may soon be insufficient in the context of 
mounting pressure from what is broadly under-
stood as the ruling camp (both the presidential 
centre and the prime minister’s centre). Due to 
the upcoming elections, the government will 
be unwilling to make decisions that would af-
fect its approval rating, including further liber-
alisation of the gas price paid by households. 
The stabilisation of the economic situation and 
the success in entering the international lend-
ing market8 have increased the government’s 
resistance to requirements formulated by West-
ern creditors. So far, these have been the main 
promoters of reforms in Ukraine and the de-
fenders of Naftogaz’s executives. 
Another important aspect of the present dis-
pute as a whole is the government’s intention 
to install its people in the management bod-
ies of Naftogaz’s most profitable companies. 
These people would for example be expected 
to guarantee funding for the electoral cam-
paign, which is extremely costly in Ukraine. 
8 S. Matuszak, Udana sprzedaż obligacji przez Ukrainę, 
Analizy OSW, 20 September 2017, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-09-20/udana-sprze-
daz-obligacji-przez-ukraine 
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Since 2014, the new management boards 
of Naftogaz and Ukrgazvydobuvannya have 
considerably curbed the corruption that had 
hitherto been endemic. However, this pro-
cess is far from irreversible. At present, in the 
context of the prospect of the government 
taking over control of Naftogaz, a real threat 
has emerged that the old corruption schemes 
may return. This would spell not only a halt 
in the process of gas sector reform but even 
its regress.
